Agency Deference Skepticism. A posture that courts should use **independent judicial judgment** on statutory meaning rather than deferring to agency interpretations, especially after the retrenchment of deference doctrines.
# Core commitments - **Judicial responsibility** to “say what the law is.” - Deference limited to **persuasive** weight (e.g., Skidmore), not binding. - Regulatory deference (Auer) available only under **narrow conditions**.
# Methods & tools - Plain-meaning analysis with **no Chevron step-two** safety net. - Consider agency experience as **persuasive** but not controlling. - Apply **Kisor** limits before relying on agency readings of their own rules.
# Strengths claimed - **Rule-of-law clarity**; reduces agency self-aggrandizement. - **Separation of powers**; interpretation remains judicial.
# Common critiques - **Judicial policymaking risk**; judges, not experts, resolve technical ambiguities. - **Congressional overload**; demands ever-greater statutory precision.
# Notes - Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024) ended Chevron deference; courts now decide statutory meaning independently while considering agency views. Kisor v. Wilkie (2019) narrowed Auer deference to agency interpretations of their **own regulations** under strict preconditions. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}