Textualism holds that judges should interpret legal texts (statutes and often the Constitution) according to the **ordinary meaning of the words in context**, as understood at the time of enactment, without privileging unenacted intentions or legislative history.
# Core commitments - **The text is the law**; context means linguistic and structural context, not free-ranging purpose. - Preference for **semantic canons** (e.g., whole-text canon, noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis). - Skepticism toward **legislative history** as an interpretive trump.
# Methods & tools - Ordinary-meaning analysis; dictionaries and usage evidence. - **Canons of construction** and structural inferences. - **Rule of lenity** and other neutral tie-breakers where appropriate.
# Strengths claimed - **Rule-of-law values**: notice, constraint, administrability. - **Even-handedness**: same methods across cases and litigants.
# Common critiques - **Canon indeterminacy**: multiple canons can point in different directions. - **Under-purposing**: rigid readings may defeat obvious statutory goals. - **Historical blind spots** when context requires background purpose.
# Close contrasts - Originalism adds a stronger historical anchor for constitutional cases. - Purposivism/Living Constitutionalism prioritizes statutory or constitutional **purpose** over literal readings.
# Notes - See Scalia & Garner, *Reading Law*, for canonical textualist methods.