Ambiguity in law is not always a weakness. While it may lead to uncertainty or disputes, many scholars argue that ambiguity is also a feature of legal systems, serving important functions in practice.
One key value of ambiguity is Flexibility. Laws written with open-textured terms such as "reasonable," "due care," or "cruel and unusual" can adapt to circumstances that legislators could not foresee.
This adaptability helps legal systems remain relevant as society, technology, and culture change over time. H.L.A. Hart described this as the "open texture" of legal language - plato.stanford.edu 
Ambiguity also supports Delegation of Discretion. Legislatures often leave statutes broad or vague so that judges, administrators, or regulators can interpret them in light of specific cases. This allows decision-making to be informed by expertise and context rather than rigid rules.
Another function is Facilitation of Compromise. Political actors may only reach agreement by settling on language that is intentionally ambiguous. This enables laws to be enacted even when strong disagreements exist about their precise meaning. Scholars such as Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter have shown how deliberate ambiguity in statutes reflects the political realities of coalition-building - nyulawreview.org
Ambiguity can also foster Democratic Engagement. Because meaning remains open, citizens and courts continue to debate how legal principles apply. Ronald Dworkin argued that interpretation is not a defect of law but part of its integrity. This ongoing interpretive practice helps ensure that law remains a living institution rather than a fixed code - plato.stanford.edu
There is also a Moral Dimension. Ambiguous constitutional phrases like "equal protection" or "due process" invite courts to consider ethical arguments about justice. If every provision were precise, law could risk being unjust by failing to account for evolving moral understandings.
Finally, ambiguity can be a Strategic Tool. Governments sometimes employ "constructive ambiguity" to postpone conflict, manage controversial issues, or maintain stability while leaving room for later interpretation. This technique, though often criticized, shows how deliberate vagueness can serve political as well as legal purposes.
# See
- H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (1961)
- Ronald Dworkin, *Law’s Empire* (1986)
- Cass Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law” (*University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 1996)
- scholarship.law.upenn.edu
- Jeremy Waldron, *Law and Disagreement* (1999)
- Victoria Nourse & Jane Schacter, “The Politics of Legislative Drafting” (*NYU Law Review*, 2002)
- Lawrence Solan, *The Language of Judges* (1993)
- Janet Ainsworth, “Categories and Culture” (*Cornell Law Review*, 1996)